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Summary  
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse, through a theoretical model, the effects that 
the trade integration of two countries may have on industrial location, growth and 
welfare.  
The conclusions reached finally depend both on whether the import or the export 
costs are affected by the trade policies on which the integration process is based and on 
whether the rich or the poor country introduces them. In general, when integration leads 
to an increase of industrial concentration in the rich country, the growth rate increases 
and welfare improves in both countries. If integration means that industry moves to the 
poor country, the growth rate decreases; in spite of this, in this case the poor country 
can also improve its welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the mid-20th century, international efforts to reduce the costs of trade have 
intensified. The GATT (now the WTO) has been trying to reduce barriers to trade since 
1947, and there are many other international agreements, such as MERCOSUR, with 
the same intention. The European Union deserves a special mention because, while it 
does not respond to trade issues alone, it is the furthest-reaching international 
integration process and the one in which more countries are involved.  
In 1957, the founding states of the European Economic Community were in a 
very similar economic situation, occupied with reconstruction after WWII and with 
homogenous per capita incomes. Aside from political motives, the main economic aim 
of this union was the elimination of trade barriers. This measure meant a simultaneous 
reduction of import costs for member states. The favourable situation of the 
international economy at the time, together with the good trade results of the lowering 
of barriers, allowed the Customs Union to be reached two years ahead of schedule, in 
1968. However, this was not the end of the story. Once the trade barriers had 
disappeared, member states continued to implement a series of measures which, 
although responding to political reasons, also had an effect on commercial relations 
(and on industrial location, growth and welfare). The clearest example is the 
harmonisation of legislation carried out through rulings and directives in fields such as 
competition law or consumer rights, which makes it easier for firms to export to other 
EU countries or even to establish themselves there.  
In fact, as more countries have joined the European Union, the heterogeneity 
between them has been increasing (mainly, but not only, in terms of per capita income).  
This has motivated an increase in the number of policies and instruments devoted to 
homogenising and reducing trade costs. 
Among the various types of policies, we can distinguish between those that 
affect one or several countries and those that modify the overall framework of the 
Union. The first include the Cohesion Funds and ERDF (European Regional 
Development Fund), which normally finance infrastructure projects in the member 
states with the lowest per capita income1. Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi (2003) calculate 
that, for the period 1989-1999, almost half (49.6 %) of the Structural Funds for 
Objective 1 regions were allocated to investment in infrastructures, transport and 
environment. Their effects were local, as they decreased the costs of internal 
transactions.  
We also find policies which affect only the imports or exports of one of the 
members. The typical political measures on trade, such as tariffs, quotas and other non-
tariff barriers, are mainly related to imports. The policies affecting exports are basically 
export subsidies but also internal legislation in the style of the US anti-trust laws or 
different types of public aid (such as direct grants, tax incentives for continued training 
activities in companies) for the improvement of product quality, design, packaging or 
                                                 
1 Obviously, the main purpose of these investments is not to reduce trade costs but rather to encourage the 
economic and social cohesion of the poorest regions of the Union, as affirmed in article 158 of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community. Paradoxically, although their effects on transaction costs are 
clear, it does not appear to be empirically demonstrated that the aim of reducing inequality is being 
achieved. Several studies (see Garcia-Milà and McGuire, 2001, or Boldrin and Canova, 2001) suggest a 
weak impact of EU regional funds on regional inequalities and convergence.    
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marketing, which facilitate penetration in external markets. In this group we can also 
include any public policy devoted to the improvement of industrial technology as a way 
of favouring external competition (see Pollard and Storper, 1996). Sheringhaus and 
Rosson (1990) provide a complete set of public measures undertaken by developed 
countries to foster exports. Recent studies analyse the impact on exports of government 
export promotion assistance programs (Gencturk and Kotabe, 2001) and of export 
promotion agencies and their strategies (Rose, 2005; Lederman et al., 2006; and Gil 
Pareja, 2008). They find a positive and statistically significant effect of these public 
policies on exports. 
Among the measures affecting the overall framework of the Union, we can 
highlight the introduction of the Euro in 1999, which facilitated trade by reducing 
uncertainties about exchange rates. Investment in trans-European networks can also be 
included in this group, since investment in infrastructures facilitates economic 
integration (Puga, 2002; Vickerman et al., 1999). These measures affect the transaction 
costs of all the member states at the same time. 
Thus, any integration process can involve a wide set of  policy measures devoted 
to reducing transaction costs. Martin and Rogers (1995) defined public infrastructure as 
any good or service provided by the state which can facilitate the connection between 
production and consumption. Good infrastructures mean low transaction costs; poor 
infrastructures represent a situation where trade is difficult because of the high costs 
incurred. It is evident that transport and communication media can be included among 
these trade infrastructures, but there are other elements, such as the legal system or the 
levels of public safety, which have an equally great influence on trade. We will consider 
the latter, besides the more common transport costs, when we analyse the effects of a 
reduction of transaction costs. 
The aim of this paper is to present, from a theoretical perspective, a model in 
which to analyse the effects of a reduction in trade costs (in a wide sense, not only 
transport costs). We consider iceberg costs (Samuelson, 1954): a portion of every good 
produced is lost in transport and, thus, not finally consumed. The portion lost can be 
reduced by adequate trade policies.  
The interest of our analysis comes from the fact that a trade integration process 
not only changes internal trade and commercial relations with other countries, but also 
has repercussions on other key aspects of the spatial and temporal organisation of 
economic activity. The ample literature in the field of economic geography has 
discussed its  implications for industrial location2 (the basic mechanisms of transmission 
in models of economic geography are described, for example, in the survey of Ottaviano 
and Puga, 1997). But, in a dynamic context, the capacity for sustaining long-run 
economic growth can also be influenced. Finally, due to this diversity of influences, 
trade integration also has an impact on social welfare. This is an important dimension 
because, generally, neither the concentration of activity nor a higher growth rate are 
                                                 
2 Empirically, the intensity of these effects may vary according to regional characteristics. Huber (2004) 
analyses the case of the EU during the period 1975-2000 and considers a series of variables (salaries, 
population growth, investment rates, productivity and salary growth) where the effect of increases has 
been small, although effects on regional salaries and investment rates are stronger than the rest, at least in 
the long term. Hanson (1997, 1998) finds that the formation of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) led to a less concentrated spatial distribution of production in Mexico because it 
was more beneficial for firms to be sited along the frontier with the US than in the old industrial belt of 
Mexico City. Sjöberg (2004) concludes that the liberalisation of trade in Indonesia did not decrease 
spatial concentration in the manufacturing industry for the period 1980-1996. 
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necessarily associated with greater levels of welfare (for example, Pfüger and Südekum, 
2007, find, in a simple model of economic geography, that the spatial distribution of the 
most efficient activity depends decisively on the degree of freedom of trade). 
In this work, we follow the model developed by Martin and Ottaviano (1999), 
which joins a framework of endogenous growth similar to Romer (1990) and Grossman 
and Helpman (1991) with a geographical framework similar to Helpman and Krugman 
(1985) and Krugman (1991). Martin and Ottaviano’s model, which only analysed the 
role of common international infrastructures, was widened in Martin (1999) to include 
domestic infrastructures. In both cases, the role of public infrastructures was introduced 
following the static model of Martin and Rogers (1995), which distinguishes between 
domestic and common international infrastructures. We will go a step further and 
consider a wider casuistry, following Lanaspa and Sanz (2004), including asymmetries 
in what we can refer to, in a broad sense, as import and export infrastructures. 
We consider two countries that are heterogeneous in two main aspects. First, in 
their trade policies, that is to say, the wide set of measures that can promote either 
imports or exports. This gives value to this paper, since, as far as we know, no work has 
been devoted to analysing such policies from a theoretical point of view.  Second, they 
are also considered different in their per capita incomes since, as we will see, the effects 
of any measure can depend on the characteristics of the country that introduces it. 
When the integration process consists of a reduction in the costs associated with 
the internal trade of the rich country, its exports or the imports of the poor country, 
some firms move from the poor to the rich country and the growth rate accelerates. As a 
consequence, the welfare of both countries increases. However, when the internal trade 
of the poor country or its exports are promoted, the firms tend to move to the poor 
country and the growth rate diminishes. Although the latter effect could be associated 
with a loss of welfare (which would make this type of policies pointless), this is not 
necessarily the case for the poor country. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic characteristics of 
the theoretical model. Section 3 deals with geography, that is, with the equilibrium 
distribution of firms. Section 4 determines the steady state growth rate, which depends 
on industrial location, but also influences it through the resulting distribution of income. 
Section 5 analyses the effects of economic integration through the impact of different 
trade policies. Section 6 considers a simpler framework to analyse specific policy 
measures whose effects are not conclusive in a general framework. Finally, in Section 7, 
some simulations are carried out to analyse the effects of trade policies on welfare. The 
work ends with the conclusions. 
 
2. The model 
We consider two countries, North and South, which trade with each other. They 
are identical except for their initial level of capital, 0K  in the North and 
∗
0K  in the 
South, and their trade policies. We suppose that the initial endowment of capital is 
greater in the North: ∗> 00 KK . Both countries are inhabited by representative households 
playing the part of consumers, workers and researchers. There are L families, both in the 
North and in the South. Labour is mobile between sectors but immobile between 
countries, which excludes accumulative causation and impedes a catastrophic 
agglomeration.  
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Given that the model is almost symmetrical, we will focus on the description of 
the economy of the North (an asterisk denotes that the variables correspond to the 
South). The preferences are instantaneously nested-CES and intertemporally CES, with 
an elasticity of intertemporal substitution equal to the unit: 
[ ]∫∞ ⋅−−= 0 10 )()(log dtetYtDU tραα  , 10 << α  (1) 
where 0>ρ  is the intertemporal discount rate, Y is the numerary good and D is a 
composite good à la Dixit-Stiglitz, which consists of a number of different varieties: 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −− ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= ∫ σσ 11
1
)(
0
11
)()(
tN
i ditDtD  , 1>σ   (2) 
N is the total number of varieties produced between the two countries, and σ is the 
elasticity of substitution between varieties, assuming that N is high enough. It can be 
shown that σ is also the demand price elasticity of the demand for each variety. Growth 
is produced through an increase in the number of varieties. 
 The value of spending per capita E in terms of the numerary Y is: 
EYdjDpdiDp
nj jjXCMni iiD
=++ ∫∫ ∗∈ ∗∗∈ ττττ  , τ > 1. (3)  
The number of manufactured goods produced in each country, n  and ∗n , is 
endogenous, with ∗+= nnN .  
Domestic trade costs are represented by the parameters Dτ  and ∗Dτ , and common 
international costs by Cτ . The latter affect the flow of trade between the countries, as do 
the costs of imports ( ∗MM ττ , ) and exports ( ∗XX ττ , ). All the τ>1 are considered to be 
iceberg costs, as in Samuelson (1954), which affect only the differentiated good (not the 
homogenous one), according to the following outline: 
 
 
That is to say, for the North, for each unit of good traded, only 11 <−Dτ  is 
available for consumption and, of each unit sent to the South from the North, 
only ( ) 1  1 <−∗MCX τττ  really reaches the consumer. These transaction costs affect 
internal trade ( Dτ  for the North and ∗Dτ  for the South) and international trade ( ∗MCX τττ  
for a sale from the North and ∗XCM τττ  for a sale from the South). Thus, any jτ  captures 
that a portion of the good is lost in transit and, as in Martin and Rogers (1995), 
North  South 
∗
MCX τττ
∗
XCM τττ
∗
Dτ  
Dτ  
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constitutes a measure of how easy trade is. Reductions in any jτ  denote lower 
transaction costs and, thus, indicate that trade is easier.  
Note that the import costs of a country do not coincide with the export costs of 
the other because they capture the trade policy decisions taken by each country 
individually. For example, the North may decide to establish export subsidies ( Xτ  
decreases), which make the market of the other country more accessible for their 
products. A similar effect can be achieved by the South through a reduction in their 
import tariffs ( ∗Mτ decreases). But, although they can have the same effect, they should 
be considered conceptually as different because the country that introduces the policy is 
different. 
From here on, we will assume that ∗< XCM ττττ D  and that ∗∗ < MCXD ττττ : it is 
more expensive in terms of transaction costs to buy a differentiated good from abroad 
than to buy one made in the same country. We also assume that ∗< DD ττ : the domestic 
trade costs are lower in the rich country.  
 The numerary good Y is produced using only labour, subject to constant returns 
in a perfectly competitive sector. As labour is mobile between sectors, the constant 
returns in this sector tie down the wage rate w in each country at each moment. We 
assume throughout the paper that the parameters of the model are such that the 
numerary is produced in both countries, that is, that the total demand for the numerary is 
big enough so as not to be satisfied with its production in a single country. In this way, 
wages are maintained constant and identical in both countries. A unit of labour is 
needed to produce a unit of Y, so free competition in the labour market implies 
that 1=w in both countries. 
 The differentiated goods are produced with identical technology in an industry 
with monopolistic competition with increasing returns in the production of each variety. 
To begin to produce a variety of a good, a unit of capital is needed; this fixed cost is the 
source of scale economies. Also, β units of labour are used to produce a unit of 
differentiated good. The standard rule of monopolistic competition determines the price 
of any variety as a margin over the cost of labour: ( )1−==∗ σβσpp . The operating 
profits of a producer are: 
)1(
)()( −=−= σ
ββπ xpxpxp iiiii ,  (4) 
where x is the scale of a representative firm, equal for all varieties because of symmetry.  
Investment is necessary to produce a new variety, whether in a physical asset 
(machinery) or an intangible one (patent). The concept of capital used corresponds to a 
mixture of the two types of investment. The value of the firm which produces a new 
variety is the value of its unit of capital. The total number of varieties and firms is 
determined by the stock of capital at any given time: ∗∗ +=+= KKnnN . Once the 
investment is made, each firm produces the new variety in a situation of monopoly and 
chooses where to locate its production (we assume that there are no costs of relocating 
the capital from one country to the other). Unlike firms, households 
(workers/researchers/consumers) are immobile and, therefore, their incomes are 
geographically fixed although firms move. In other words, if a firm owner decides to 
locate production in a country where he does not reside, he will repatriate the profits.  
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Finally, we assume there is a safe asset which pays an interest rate r whose 
market is characterised by freedom of financial movement between the two countries (r 
= r*).  
Resolving the first order conditions of the problem of the consumer in the North, 
we obtain the demands for each variety in the North ( iD ) or the South ( jD ), and that of 
the numerary good: 
( )∗∗+⋅−= XCMDD Di nn ED δδδδτ αδβσσ 1 ,   (5) 
( )∗∗∗
∗
+⋅
−=
XCMDXCM
XCM
j nn
ED δδδδτττ
αδδδ
βσ
σ 1 ,  (6)  
EY )1( α−= ,      (7) 
where στδ −= 1jj  ( CXMDj ,,,= ) are parameters between 0 and 1 which measure the 
openness of trade. The highest openness is found when  1=jδ (there are no trade costs). 
The expressions of the demand of a consumer from the South will be analogous to the 
above.  
 The intertemporal optimisation of the consumers implies that the spending 
growth rate is, both in the North and in the South, ρ−== ∗
•
∗•
r
E
E
E
E , that is, the 
difference between the interest rate and the intertemporal discount rate. In the steady 
state, E  and ∗E  must be constant, so ρ=r , as we shall see below. 
 
3. Geography  
The geographical part of the model refers to the location of the firms, given that 
the population is immobile between countries3. The equilibrium location between firms 
is determined by four equilibrium conditions. The first two indicate that, when 
differentiated goods are produced in both countries, the total demand, coming from both 
North and South, of each variety (including transport costs) must equal supply. Thus, 
starting from (5) and (6): 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−+−+⋅
−= ∗∗
∗∗
∗
MCXnDn
MCX
XCMnDn
D
SSN
E
SSN
ELx δδδδ
δδδ
δδδδ
δ
βσ
σα
11
)1( , (8) 
                                                 
3 The populations are tied to their country but they are very interested in the location of firms because the 
more firms in the region, the lower the price index they have to bear. The price indexes are: 
[ ] σσ δδδδσβσ −∗− −+⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −= 1
1
1
1
)1(
1 XCMnDn
SSNP  in the North and [ ] σσ δδδδσβσ −∗∗−∗ +−⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −= 1
1
1
1
)1(
1 MCXnDn
SSNP  in 
the South, where  
N
nSn =  is the share of manufactured goods produced in the North. 
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( )[ ] ( )[ ]⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+++−⋅
−= ∗
∗
∗∗
∗∗∗
XCMnDn
XCM
MCXnDn
D
SSN
E
SSN
ELx δδδδ
δδδ
δδδδ
δ
βσ
σα
11
)1( . (9)
   
 The third condition is the consequence of the free movement of capital between 
countries ( ∗= rr ), which implies an equal retribution via profits: 
∗= ππ      (10) 
so, in agreement with (4), the same quantity is produced of all the varieties (whether in 
the North or the South), ∗= xx . Finally, the fourth condition, already shown, indicates 
that the total number of varieties is fixed by the world supply of capital at each moment: 
NKKnn =+=+ ∗∗  .    (11) 
Resolving the system formed by these four equations, the optimum size of each 
firm in equilibrium is obtained: 
N
EE)1(Lxx
∗
∗ +
βσ
−σα== .    (12)  
The proportion of firms in the North (
N
n
nS = ) is: 
( ) ( )( )∗
∗
∗∗
∗
−
−−−= XCMD
XCME
MCXD
DE
n
SSS δδδδ
δδδ
δδδδ
δ 1 ,   (13) 
where ∗+= EE
ESE  is the participation of the North in the total spending. The location 
equilibrium of firms depends on the national spending -greater spending implies a 
bigger domestic market, which attracts more firms who want to take advantage of 
increasing returns (home market effect)- and on all the parameters which represent trade 
costs. 
 
4. Growth and income inequality  
Economic growth 
Firstly, we will focus on the growth rate of the economy. Starting from the 
solution of the problem of the intertemporal optimisation of the consumer, we know 
that, in equilibrium, ρ−== ∗
•
∗•
r
E
E
E
E ; as the capital flows are free, ∗= rr  and the 
growth rate of spending will be the same in both countries. From (13), this implies that 
the ratio of producing firms in the North, nS , is also constant in time and, thus, n , 
∗n  
and N grow at the same constant rate ∗
•
∗••
===
n
n
n
n
N
Ng .  
There are national spillovers in the innovation sector, that is to say, the more 
firms producing different manufactured goods in the same country, the less expensive 
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the R&D activity4. This sector follows Grossman and Helpman (1991), with 
n
η  being 
the cost in terms of labour of an innovation in the North and ∗n
η  in the South. The 
immediate conclusion of this formulation of the sector is that, for efficiency reasons, 
research activity will only take place in one of the two countries, namely, the one with 
more firms producing the manufactured goods (which will be the rich country, the 
North). No researcher would have an incentive to start R&D activity in the other 
country. This formulation makes the analytical treatment of the model easier. More 
generally, if there is a certain degree of diffusion of knowledge at international level 
(Hirose and Yamamoto, 2007), R&D would be concentrated in the country with fewer 
innovation costs; in this case, trade policies could generate changes in the location of 
this activity.  
The value of the firm is given by its unit of capital and, as the market is 
competitive, this value ( v ) will be the production cost of the unit of capital, 
nNSn
v ηη == . Thus, v decreases at the same rate at which N increases: g
v
v −=
•
. As the 
number of varieties rises, the profits and value of each firm diminish, which can also be 
interpreted as the future flow of discounted profits [ ] ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−= ∫
∞ −−
t
tRsR dssxetv
1
)()( )()( σ
β , 
where R represents the cumulative discount factor. Taking into account the condition of 
arbitrage between the capital market and the safe asset, the relation between interest 
rates and the value of capital will be:  
vv
vr π+=
•
 .    (14)  
The restriction of world resources, ( ) ( )nLSrEE η+=+ ∗ 2 , ensures that 
spending is constant over time; so, in the steady state ρ=r . Finally, we must take into 
account the restriction of the world labour market: total labour is distributed between 
the production of differentiated goods, the production of the numerary good and R&D:  
LEEL
S
g
n
2)( =+−+ ∗σ
αση .        (15) 
In the steady state (its calculation is given in appendix A), the variables will 
grow at a constant rate. By substituting in (14) the benefits obtained in (4) and the 
optimum size of the firms in the equilibrium given by (12), and taking into account (15) 
and the condition ρ=r , we obtain that the steady state growth rate of K  and ∗K  (the 
same for both countries) is given by: 
( )nn SgSLg =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−⋅= ρσ
ασ
σ
α
η
2 .   (16) 
                                                 
4 This type of knowledge spillovers is closer to the concept of Jacobs (1969) than to that of Marshall-
Arrow-Romer (MAR). The empirical evidence for these external effects between different industries in 
the same geographical unit is documented in, for example, Glaeser et al. (1992) and Henderson et al. 
(1995). 
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This rate depends upon the structural parameters of the model ( ρσαη ,,,,L ); it 
also has a linear dependence on the variable that represents geography ( nS ).  
 
World income distribution 
Secondly, we want to know how this growth rate affects the inequality of 
income between the countries; let us remember that we have supposed that the North is 
initially the richer ( ∗> 00 KK ). The per capita income of each country is the sum of 
labour income, which we have already seen is the unit, plus the capital income, which is 
the value of per capita wealth multiplied by the equilibrium interest rate. Thus, for the 
North, it will be 
L
Kv
L
KvrE ρ+=+= 11 . If we substitute v  applying the arbitrage 
equation (14), the equilibrium profits given by (4) and the optimum production scale 
obtained in (12), it is possible to express spending as a function of g:  
( ) g
SE K σρασ
αρ
+−+=
2
1 ,   (17) 
where NKSK =  is the ratio of capital in the North, which is maintained constant 
because N  and K  K, ∗  grow at the same rate g in the steady state. Similarly, for the 
South: 
( )
( ) g
SE Kσρασ
αρ
+−
−+=∗ 121 .   (18) 
We previously defined the ratio ∗+= EE
ES E , which represents the participation 
of the North in the total income or spending. Substituting the expressions (17) and (18), 
we obtain: ( ) ( )
( )g
Sg
S KE +
−++⋅= ρσ
αρρσ 12
2
1 .   (19)  
If, as we have supposed, the North is richer and 
2
1SK > , then 
2
1>ES . However, 
the relationship of ES  with the growth rate is negative: a greater number of varieties 
diminishes the value of capital and, given that the North has more capital, the distance is 
reduced in relative terms. 
Finally, to carry out the analysis in the following section, we want to relate 
geography )( nS  with the growth rate g. To do so, we substitute (19) in (13), obtaining: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) =⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ +
−⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+−+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−−⋅= ∗
∗
∗∗
∗
∗
∗
∗∗
∗
g
S
S K
XCMD
XCM
MCXD
D
XCMD
XCM
MCXD
D
n ρσ
αρ
δδδδ
δδδ
δδδδ
δ
δδδδ
δδδ
δδδδ
δ 12
2
1
 ( )[ ]gSS En= .         (20) 
 
5. Effects of trade integration 
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As we explained in the introduction, the purpose of this paper is to analyse the 
consequences of a trade integration process, which is represented through a decrease in 
trade costs. We distinguish between domestic and international costs and, within the 
latter, common, import and export costs. Remember that, while domestic and common 
international costs can be easily associated with physical trade infrastructures (although 
they are not necessarily so), import and export costs also include the whole range of 
trade policies that affect the sales to, or the purchases from, abroad. We carry out our 
analysis from the perspective of the effects of these policies on industrial location, 
growth rate and welfare. 
We adopt the simplifying assumption that the reduction of any of these costs 
requires no financing from either of the countries, either because the measures involve 
no cost or because the financing comes from, for example, an international organisation. 
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, we are using a broad concept of costs that 
encompasses very different elements. Dismantling administrative obstacles (like tariff 
barriers) is essentially free of cost, but physical infrastructures do require a strong 
outlay. Given this heterogeneity of trade policies, it is difficult to choose a single 
formula of financing that applies to all of them. Secondly, the explicit consideration of 
means of financing would make the treatment of the model cumbersome without adding 
qualitatively different results.  
In the previous section, where we considered that the two countries are different 
(one rich and one poor), we obtained two equations, (16) and (20), which relate the 
growth rate with the distribution of firms, and vice versa. The function ( )nSgg =  is 
linear and increasing: given that technological spillovers are local, the higher the 
industrial concentration, the lower the innovation costs and the greater the growth rate. 
The function ( )gSS nn =  is convex and decreasing. Remember that this equation 
includes the inequality of incomes, ( )[ ]gSSS Enn = , and that this decreases as g 
increases via the reduction of the monopolistic profits of the firms. At the same time, as 
the differences in income vanish, industrial concentration and the rich country’s market 
size decrease as a consequence of the “home market effect”.  These functions are 
represented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. – Growth rate and firms location.  
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The variations in any type of trade costs do not affect the straight line ( )nSgg = , which depends only on the structural parameters of the model. They will 
only affect the curve ( )gSS nn = , changing its position and inclination.  
 Below, we look at the different effects of trade integration according to the 
specific type of trade costs that are reduced. 
 
Domestic trade costs 
When commercial integration takes the form of a reduction in domestic costs, it 
increases the effective internal demand (domestic consumers bear fewer transport costs) 
and thus attracts firms to the country in which the policy has been implemented. If it is 
the North, which is the richer country and thus has a bigger market, firms will decide to 
move to the North to take more advantage of increasing returns and the ratio nS  will 
increase (remember that there are no relocation costs). Concentration improves the 
growth rate (Figure 2); the more manufacturers located in the North, the lower the 
innovation costs in the R&D sector: 
0>∂
∂
D
nS
δ , 0>∂
∂
D
g
δ . 
 
Figure 2. – Reduction in domestic trade costs in the rich country. 
 
The same reasoning is applied if the poor country reduces its domestic trade 
costs: more firms are attracted, wanting to better exploit its growing returns and its 
increasing effective internal demand. But the effect on the growth rate is different: as 
firms move to the South, the externalities derived from the variety of products in the 
North are reduced, the costs of the research sector are increased, and the economy’s 
growth rate (Figure 3) decreases: 
0<∂
∂
∗
D
nS
δ , 0<∂
∂
∗
D
g
δ .    
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However, this benefits the inhabitants of the North, because the rate at which 
their capital loses value (g) is reduced; this implies from (19) that income inequality 
increases. 
 
Figure 3. – Reduction in domestic trade costs in the poor country. 
 
Import-enhancing policies 
When one of the countries reduces its import costs, it becomes easier to reach its 
market from the other country (think, for example, of a lowering of tariffs). If the North 
carries out such measures, the effective demand of the consumers of the North for the 
goods produced in the South will increase, so some firms located in the North will 
decide to move to the South. For these firms, this movement means two advantages. On 
the one hand, they can better satisfy the demand of consumers in the South when the 
costs of sending a unit from the North ( ∗MCX τττ ) are replaced by just the internal 
transport costs ( ∗Dτ ) of the South (remember that ∗∗ < MCXD ττττ ). On the other hand, 
firms moving to the South benefit from the increase in effective demand due to the 
reduction in import costs (from which they would not benefit if they stayed in the 
North). The relocation of manufacturing firms also has a negative effect on R&D as it 
provokes an increase in research costs through the reduction of externalities in the North 
and, thus, also negatively affects the growth rate of the economy (a similar situation to 
that of Figure 3): 
 0<∂
∂
M
nS
δ , 0<∂
∂
M
g
δ . 
When the South is the country that introduces policies that reduce its import 
costs, firms will move to the North, benefiting from the increase in effective demand of 
the consumers in the South for the goods produced in the North and from the reduction 
in transport costs when substituting ∗XCM τττ  by Dτ  ( ∗< XCM ττττ D ). But the effects on 
growth will be positive: with the increase in the number of firms located in the North, 
the cost of R&D decreases and the economy’s growth rate increases (a similar situation 
to Figure 2): 
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 0>∂
∂
∗
M
nS
δ , 0>∂
∂
∗
M
g
δ . 
Moreover, from (19), the inequality of income between the two countries is 
reduced. 
 To sum up, the country that decides to dismantle trade barriers (thus reducing 
import costs) will lose firms, so neither country has incentives to carry out this measure 
unilaterally. If the two countries decide to carry out an equal and simultaneous change, 
that is, a joint lowering of trade barriers, the effect on the location of industries and 
growth is indeterminate. Thus, a joint lowering of trade barriers can lead to a rise in the 
growth rate only in some specific cases (Appendix B). 
  
Export-enhancing policies 
The policies that reduce export costs make it easier to penetrate the market of the 
other country, i.e., the market potential is increased for the firms of the country 
implementing these policies. If the North carries out such measures, more firms will 
come from the South because it is now less expensive to send goods from the North to 
the South, and in the richer country increasing returns can be exploited better.  With the 
increase in the number of firms, research costs will be reduced, thanks to the national 
spillovers, and the growth rate will rise (a similar situation to Figure 2):  
0>∂
∂
X
nS
δ , 0>∂
∂
X
g
δ . 
 But if the poor country reduces its export costs, it will also be capable of 
attracting firms. The lowering of transport costs means an increase in the effective 
demand of consumers in the North for the goods produced in the South; the firms which 
move to the South can benefit from this increase, as well as from the reduction in trade 
costs associated to sales in the South (from ∗MCX τττ  to ∗Dτ ). The effect on the growth 
rate will be negative (a situation identical to Figure 3), as the number of firms in the 
country where the most efficient R&D sector is located will decrease: 
 0<∂
∂
∗
X
nS
δ , 0<∂
∂
∗
X
g
δ . 
 In this case, the trade policy will achieve its aim of attracting more firms and 
increasing economic activity; the country which improves its export costs receives new 
firms, while the other country loses them. However, what happens if the two countries 
agree to stop subsidising exports?  As in the case of the joint lowering of tariffs, a co-
ordinated action produces an indeterminate result. Again, depending on the initial 
conditions, trade integration based on a joint action on export infrastructures might 
increase growth (Appendix B). 
 
International common trade costs 
Determining the effect of a reduction in common international trade costs is 
more difficult. Differentiating (16) and (20) and grouping terms, we obtain: 
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The effect remains indeterminate. The first bracket has a positive sign as long as 
the North is richer ( 21>KS ) but, in the second bracket, we can identify two opposite 
effects: 
1. A positive effect corresponding to the first term, whose magnitude depends on ES  
and which we identify with the home market effect; the change in Cδ  means that it 
is less costly to send goods to the South, so it is more attractive for firms to be 
located in the North, where the market is bigger and they can take better advantage 
of increasing returns. Evidently, if ES  is greater, concentration will probably be 
accentuated due to a greater home market effect. 
2. But the reduction in common trade costs also means a decrease in the cost of 
sending goods from the South to the North. And the lower the costs of importing in 
the North and exporting in the South, the bigger the decrease in transaction costs 
from South to North in relative terms, and the more firms will decide to relocate in 
the South. This negative effect is captured in the second term. The competition 
effect is also operative. We must not forget that the monopolistic profits decrease 
with the number of firms so, if nS  decreases, so does the growth rate of new firms.  
 
6. Homogenous countries 
In the previous section, we have analysed the effects of integration in the most 
general framework possible, that is, considering that countries can differ both in wealth 
and in their trade policies. However, when analysing changes in common trade costs or 
simultaneous variations in export or import costs, we could not determine their effects 
on the growth rate or on industrial location. In order to carry out this analysis, we have 
to adopt a simplifying assumption that the countries are homogenous and differ only in 
their international trade policies5.    
Thus, we suppose now that the two countries have the same wealth ( 21=ES )6, 
that is, equal supply of capital ( ∗= 00 KK ), and the same domestic trade costs ( ∗= DD ττ ). 
With this simplification we eliminate one of the two effects (the home market effect) 
that cause the indetermination. Under these conditions, if the two countries have the 
same market size, the distribution of firms and the growth rate will depend only on the 
different trade costs: 
                                                 
5 The conclusions obtained in the previous section on changes carried out in only one country in import or 
export costs are maintained under this simplification. 
6 This supposition implies that equality of income is maintained constant over time and is independent of 
the growth rate. 
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1 ,     
while condition (16) remains intact: 
( )nSgg = . 
Remember that R&D will take place only in the country with more firms. In the 
earlier sections, it was the North, due to its superior initial supply of capital and the 
home market effect, which allowed us to affirm that most firms would be set up in the 
country with a bigger market and, thus, more demand. Now the location of firms will 
depend solely on the different trade costs and firms will locate in the country with the 
easiest access to the market of the other.  
Let us suppose that the North has more firms ( 21>nS ); this is the case when 
the condition ∗∗ < MCXXCM δδδδδδ  holds, that is, it is easier to send goods to the South 
from the North than vice versa. When asymmetries in per capita income and domestic 
trade costs are eliminated, this makes the North more attractive to firms than the South, 
and most will be located there. If this condition is fulfilled, nS  will be a horizontal 
straight line with positive order in the origin. 
We will analyse the effects of integration when the countries are obliged to 
implement some kind of policy simultaneously.  
 
Import-enhancing policies 
Let us consider an equal and simultaneous lowering of import costs in the two 
countries ( ∗= MM dd δδ ), similar to lowering trade barriers: 
( ) ( ) 021 22 ><∗
∗
∗ ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−
−
−
=
XCMD
X
MCXD
X
CD
M
n
d
dS
δδδδ
δ
δδδδ
δδδδ . 
As can be seen, even maintaining the condition ∗∗ < MCXXCM δδδδδδ , the effects 
on industrial concentration and on the growth rate remain indeterminate and depend on 
the export costs in both countries. If the North has lower export costs ( ∗≥ XX δδ ), the 
effect is positive. Firms take advantage of the lowering of trade barriers to locate in the 
country with lower export costs, that is, the country where it is easier to have access to 
the market of the other, and so industrial concentration will increase. And the increase 
in the number of firms in the North will provoke an increase in the growth rate of the 
economy. But, if ∗< XX δδ , the effect remains indeterminate, depending on the values of 
the different trade costs. 
 
Export-enhancing policies 
Now we will analyse a simultaneous and identical reduction in export costs in 
both countries ( ∗= XX dd δδ ). The expression obtained is the following: 
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Maintaining the condition ∗∗ < MCXXCM δδδδδδ , if the South has lower import 
costs ( MM δδ ≥∗ ), this measure constitutes an incentive for firms to move to the country 
which is more difficult to access from outside, the North (remember that we can identify 
import costs with tariffs and trade barriers in general). Thus, the effect on industrial 
concentration is positive, which benefits the R&D sector and increases the growth rate 
of the economy. However, if MM δδ <∗ , the sign is indeterminate, depending again on 
the relation between the trade costs of the two countries. 
 
Common international trade costs 
In the simplified framework of this section, the reduction of common 
international trade costs has a clear and positive sign: 0>
C
n
d
dS
δ , given that a reduction 
in Cδ  makes it even easier to reach the market of the South from the North. The greater 
concentration of firms in the North has the known positive effect on the growth rate of 
the economy, as research costs are decreased. This change is represented in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. – Reduction in common international trade costs.  
 
7. Welfare  
In previous sections, we have seen how trade integration could, depending on 
certain conditions, carry firms to the rich country, or not, and improve the growth rate, 
or not. However, nothing has been affirmed about the desirability of one or the other 
situation. In this section, we will address this gap.  
The indirect utility function of a household in the North is: 
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Similarly, for the South: 
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 Differentiating the indirect utility for the North with respect to nS , and taking 
into account that σ
α
η ⋅=∂
∂ L
S
g
n
2 , the impact of an increase in industrial concentration is 
obtained as:  
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )
( ) ( ) .0)1( )(1
1
2
2
4
2
22
>
<∗
∗
−+
−⋅−+
+−++−++−−=∂
∂
XCMnDn
XCMD
K
K
n
SS
L
gSg
LS
S
V
δδδδ
δδδδ
σρ
α
σσηρ
α
σρασηαρσραση
α
 
 The effect on welfare remains indeterminate. As in Martin and Ottaviano (1999), 
there are three effects: 
a) The first is the negative impact of an increase of g on the wealth of the North, 
captured in the first addend of the above expression. The increase of industrial 
concentration in the North diminishes the cost of R&D and raises the growth 
rate. This provokes a reduction of monopolistic profits and, thus, further lowers 
per capita income in the North. 
b) The second addend captures the positive impact on the growth rate, which 
increases the utility of individuals due to the love-of-variety effect implied by 
their preferences. 
c) The last addend captures the increase in welfare due to the decrease in transport 
costs for consumers in the North when nS  rises. 
A similar expression is obtained for the South: 
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with the difference that the sign of the third effect will be the opposite as an increase in 
industrial concentration in the North provokes an increase in the transport costs which 
will have to be borne by the consumers of the South, reducing their welfare.  
Both the indirect utility functions and their derivatives are too complex to 
evaluate analytically, so we will carry out the analysis via simulations. We want to 
know how welfare will vary in the two regions after changes in trade costs which 
provoke variations in the distribution of firms. To simplify, we analyse discrete 
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variations, focusing only on the sign of change in the utility of the two countries, which 
is obtained in (21) and (22) by evaluating the direct impact of the changes in the trade 
policies as well as the indirect effects due to the changes in nS  and g . 
 Table 1 shows the effects of reductions in trade costs, both domestic and 
international, of the rich and poor countries7.  
 
Table 1. – Effects of trade policies on concentration, growth and welfare. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In general, the results suggest that, if trade integration through the reduction of 
any kind of trade costs leads to industrial concentration in the rich country, the overall 
growth rate of the economy will rise, generating improvements in the welfare of both 
the rich and the poor country. If industrial concentration decreases in the rich country 
and industry moves to the poor country, the growth rate falls although, in spite of this, 
the poor country can increase its welfare. 
The key parameters for an increase of welfare in the poor country are the 
distribution of capital, which directly influences the equilibrium location of firms and, 
thus, influences the growth rate, and the relation between domestic and international 
transport costs. From (20), we can see how the nearer KS  is to 21 , the less impact there 
will be from a change in any trade policy on the proportion of firms in the rich country 
and, thus, on the growth rate. Therefore, the nearer KS  is to 21 , the more likely it is 
that the welfare of the poor country will improve. 
These results highlight the advantages that can be derived for the countries from 
co-ordinated policy measures, but they also open the way to the possibility of individual 
strategic behaviours which could lead to trade wars to try to claim a greater share of 
world demand. 
 
8. Conclusions 
This paper analyses the consequences of trade integration between countries that 
may be different in their wealth and in their trade policies, or similar. The aim is to 
study how industrial concentration, the growth rate of the economy and welfare are 
affected. 
Productivity growth is endogenous and based on spillovers in innovation. Since 
these spillovers are assumed to be local, R&D activities are only carried out in one of 
the countries; thus, the greater the industrial concentration in that country, the greater 
                                                 
7 The remaining parameters are No = 10, σ  = 4, α = 0.6, β = 1, η = 12, L = 3, ρ = 0.06, Sk = 0.6, similar 
values to those habitually used in the literature. 
δD δ D* δX δ C δ M* δ X*δ C δ M ΔSn Δg ΔV ΔV*
0.95 0.8 0.7 0.6     
0.96 - - - (+) (+) (+) (+) 
- 0.81 - - (-) (-) (-) (+) 
- - 0.71 - (+) (+) (+) (+) 
- - - 0.61 (-) (-) (-) (+) 
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the growth rate of the economy. The theoretical framework follows Martin and 
Ottaviano (1999), but include asymmetries which allow countries to present different 
trade policies: our model distinguishes between domestic and international trade costs 
and, within the latter, common, import and export costs.  
The differences in factor endowments (and, thus, in income), on the one hand, 
and in trade policies, on the other, are two elements which interact when determining 
both the spatial distribution of economic activity, growth and welfare and their 
evolution. 
The results we find with this classification coincide with Martin (1999) on the 
effects of domestic trade costs but differ on the effects of international costs. In Martin 
(1999), an unambiguous positive relationship between lower international transaction 
costs and growth was found. In our framework, the trade integration process can lead to 
a rise in industrial concentration, the growth rate and welfare, or not, depending on 
which country adopts the measures needed for integration and which specific costs are 
reduced. If the rich country reduces its domestic or export costs, or the poor country 
reduces its import costs, industrial concentration rises in the rich country, while the 
economic growth rate and welfare rise in both countries. However, when the poor 
country reduces its domestic costs or introduces export-enhancing policies (or the rich 
country reduces its import costs), integration leads to a lowering of industrial 
concentration and a drop in the growth rate. Although less growth could be associated 
with lower welfare, we find that this is not necessarily the case, since the poor country 
can improve its welfare, which would justify the adoption of these policies.  
In order to make the analysis clearer for some specific policies, such as the 
reduction of common international trade costs, a joint lowering of tariffs or a 
simultaneous reduction of export subsidies, we have had to simplify the model by 
considering more homogeneous countries. Any of these measures could lead to an 
increase in industrial concentration, the growth rate and welfare in both countries, as 
long as firms concentrate in the country whose market potential has been widened by 
the policies.  
To sum up, we can say that a trade integration process does not have a  
monotonic effect on industrial concentration, the economic growth rate or the welfare of 
the countries involved in it, and the final result depends on which country introduces the 
political measures and what type of trade cost is affected by that decision.   
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Appendix A: Steady state equilibrium. 
 Starting from (13), (16) and (19), the value of nS  in the steady state is the 
solution of the second degree equation: 
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The other root is greater than the unit. From this equilibrium value of nS , we 
can obtain that of g starting from (11) and that of ES  from (14). 
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Appendix B: Simultaneous variations in import and export costs. 
 We first suppose a simultaneous and identical variation in import costs 
( ∗= MM dd δδ ). Differentiating (11) and (15) and grouping terms, we obtain: 
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For an identical and simultaneous improvement in export costs ( ∗= XX dd δδ ), 
we obtain a similar expression: 
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As in the case of common trade costs, described at the end of Section 5, the sign 
of the variation in industrial location (and, thus, of the variation in the growth rate) 
remains indeterminate.  
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